Abstract-In this paper, we investigate the physical-layer security of a multi-user multi-eavesdropper cognitive radio system, which is composed of multiple cognitive users (CUs) transmitting to a common cognitive base station (CBS), while multiple eavesdroppers may collaborate with each other or perform independently in intercepting the CUs-CBS transmissions, which are called the coordinated and uncoordinated eavesdroppers, respectively. Considering multiple CUs available, we propose the round-robin scheduling as well as the optimal and suboptimal user scheduling schemes for improving the security of CUs-CBS transmissions against eavesdropping attacks. Specifically, the optimal user scheduling is designed by assuming that the channel state information (CSI) of all links from CUs to CBS, to primary user (PU) and to eavesdroppers are available. By contrast, the suboptimal user scheduling only requires the CSI of CUs-CBS links without the PU's and eavesdroppers' CSI. We derive closedform expressions of the secrecy outage probability of these three scheduling schemes in the presence of the coordinated and uncoordinated eavesdroppers. We also carry out the secrecy diversity analysis and show that the round-robin scheduling achieves the diversity order of only one, whereas the optimal and suboptimal scheduling schemes obtain the full secrecy diversity, no matter whether the eavesdroppers collaborate or not. In addition, numerical secrecy outage results demonstrate that for both the coordinated and uncoordinated eavesdroppers, the optimal user scheduling achieves the best security performance and the round-robin scheduling performs the worst. Finally, upon increasing the number of CUs, the secrecy outage probabilities of the optimal and suboptimal user scheduling schemes both improve significantly.
I. INTRODUCTION

C
OGNITIVE radio is widely recognized as a dynamic spectrum access technique, which enables unlicensed users (also called secondary users or cognitive users) and licensed users (known as primary users) to share the same spectrum but with different priorities, where the primary users (PUs) have a higher priority than the cognitive users (CUs) in accessing the licensed spectrum [1] - [3] . In cognitive radio systems, CUs are typically allowed to detect whether or not the licensed spectrum is being used by PUs through spectrum sensing functionality and then to access the detected unused spectrum (referred to as spectrum hole) [4] , [5] . Due to the dynamic nature of cognitive radio, various malicious devices may participate in the spectrum sensing and access, leading legitimate users to be exposed to both internal and external attacks [6] . For example, cognitive radio is supposed to be capable of adapting its operating parameters to any changes of its surrounding radio environment. However, a malicious attacker may intentionally modify the radio environment (e.g., by emitting interference) in which the cognitive radio operates, misleading legitimate CUs and even causing them to malfunction. Therefore, cognitive radio faces many new security challenges from all aspects of the networking architecture, including the spectrum sensing, spectrum access, and spectrum management.
Physical-layer security [7] - [9] is emerging as an effective means to protect the communications confidentiality against eavesdropping attacks by exploiting the physical characteristics (e.g., multipath fading, propagation delay, etc.) of wireless channels. It has been shown that if the wiretap channel (from source to eavesdropper) is inferior to the main channel (from source to destination), the source can reliably and securely transmit to the destination at a positive data rate (see [10] and reference therein). In [7] , Wyner introduced the notation of secrecy capacity in a discrete memoryless wiretap channel and showed the secrecy capacity as the difference between the capacities of the main channel and wiretap channel. Later on, Wyner's results were extended to the Gaussian wiretap channel in [8] and wireless fading channels in [9] and [11] , where the achievable rate-equivocation region was characterized from an information-theoretic perspective. It is noted that the secrecy capacity of wireless communications is limited and degraded due to the multipath fading effect. To this end, considerable research efforts were devoted to improving the wireless physical-layer security by employing the multipleinput multiple-output (MIMO) [12] , artificial noise [13] , [14] and beamforming techniques [15] - [17] . In addition, the joint artificial noise and beamforming design was investigated in [18] to enhance the wireless physical-layer security, where the artificial noise covariance and beamforming weights were jointly optimized with a target secrecy rate requirement. It was demonstrated that the joint artificial noise and beamforming approach further improves the wireless secrecy capacity.
As aforementioned, the physical-layer security is examined extensively for conventional non-cognitive wireless networks [9] - [18] , but is rarely studied for cognitive radio networks. The physical-layer security of cognitive transmissions was investigated in [19] - [21] where the achievable secrecy rates of the multiple-input single-output (MISO), MIMO and relay selection were developed for cognitive radio networks. More recently, in [22] , we examined the physical-layer security with multi-user scheduling for cognitive radio networks in terms of the ergodic secrecy rate and intercept probability. In this paper, we explore the physical-layer security of a multi-user multi-eavesdropper (MUME) cognitive radio network, where the eavesdroppers may collaborate with each other or perform independently in intercepting the cognitive transmissions. This is different from the existing cognitive radio security works [19] - [22] in the following aspects. On the one hand, we examine the use of multi-user scheduling for improving the physical-layer security of cognitive transmissions, whereas multiple antennas or multiple relays are employed in [19] - [21] with the aid of antenna array design or relay selection.
On the other hand, we are focused on the secrecy outage probability analysis of cognitive radio networks in the presence of both the uncoordinated and coordinated eavesdroppers, differing from our previous work [22] , where the intercept probability of cognitive transmissions was analyzed for the uncoordinated eavesdroppers only. Notice that the intercept probability was defined in [22] as the probability that the capacity of the main channel falls below that of the wiretap channel. By contrast, the secrecy outage probability is the probability that the difference between the capacity of the main channel and that of the wiretap channel becomes less than a predefined secrecy rate (i.e., R s ). It can be observed that the intercept probability is just a special case of the secrecy outage probability with R s = 0, showing that the secrecy outage probability to be studied in this paper is more general than the intercept probability analyzed in our previous work [22] . Technically speaking, it is much more challenging to obtain a closed-form expression of the secrecy outage probability than that of the intercept probability for cognitive radio networks, especially in the presence of coordinated eavesdroppers. The following summarizes the main contributions of this paper. First, we propose the round-robin scheduling, optimal user scheduling and suboptimal user scheduling to protect the cognitive transmissions against the uncoordinated and coordinated eavesdroppers. The difference between the optimal and suboptimal scheduling schemes lies in that the optimal scheduling assumes the perfect CSI of all links from CUs to CBS, to PU and to eavesdroppers, whereas the suboptimal scheduling only needs the CSI of CUs-CBS links. Since the PU's and eavesdroppers' CSI is challenging to obtain at CUs in practical systems, the suboptimal user scheduling scheme is more attractive than the optimal user scheduling from this perspective, although the latter scheme may achieve a better security performance. Second, we derive closed-form expressions of the secrecy outage probability for the roundrobin scheduling as well as the optimal and suboptimal user scheduling schemes with a PU's QoS constraint for both the uncoordinated and coordinated eavesdroppers. Last, we characterize the secrecy diversity orders of these three schemes Fig. 1 . A multi-user multi-eavesdropper (MUME) cognitive radio network coexists with a primary network.
through an asymptotic secrecy outage analysis and show that no matter whether the eavesdroppers collaborate or not, the round-robin scheduling achieves the diversity order of only one, whereas the optimal and suboptimal user scheduling schemes obtain the diversity order of M , where M is the number of CUs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We first present the system model of a MUME cognitive radio network in Section II. Then, Section III proposes the round-robin scheduling, the optimal user scheduling and the suboptimal user scheduling in the presence of multiple uncoordinated and coordinated eavesdroppers. The closed-form secrecy outage expressions of various user scheduling schemes are also derived for both the uncoordinated and coordinated eavesdroppers. Next, in Section IV, we carry out the secrecy diversity analysis of the round-robin scheduling as well as the optimal and suboptimal scheduling schemes, followed by Section V, where numerical secrecy outage results of these three schemes are provided. Finally, some concluding remarks are drawn in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
As shown in Fig. 1 , a multi-user multi-eavesdropper cognitive radio network consisting of one CBS, M CUs and N eavesdroppers shares the spectrum that is licensed to a primary network including one PT and one PR. Throughout this paper, we consider the use of underlay spectrum sharing, i.e., a CU and a PT are allowed to transmit simultaneously over the same spectrum, as long as the interference caused by CU is tolerable at PR and the quality of service (QoS) of PT-PR transmission is unaffected. We consider that PT transmits to PR without power control and a maximum interference power I is assumed to be tolerable at PR without affecting its QoS. This means that the interference received at PR from CU i must be less than the maximum tolerable level I for the sake of protecting the primary QoS. Considering that CU i transmits to CBS over the same spectrum band as the PT, we shall limit the transmit power of CU i denoted by P i as
where h ip represents the fading coefficient of the CU i -PR channel. It is pointed out that the simple power control model given by (1) is widely used in literature [23] - [25] for characterizing the underlay cognitive radio. As shown in (1), the transmit power of CU i is a function of the random fading |h ip | 2 , which makes the closed-form secrecy outage probability analysis of the cognitive transmissions become more challenging. Considering a maximum power constraint P , the transmit power of CU i may be modeled as P i = min( I |hip| 2 , P ). Since only a constant P is introduced in this model, it will not result in any additional challenges in the secrecy outage analysis and, moreover, no new insight into the secrecy outage probability will be provided, as compared to the power control model of (1). Thus, we consider the use of (1) in modeling the CU i 's transmit power throughout this paper. In Fig. 1 , M CUs transmit their data packets to CBS, which is a typical uplink transmission scenario in cognitive radio networks [2] . Meanwhile, there are N eavesdroppers in the cognitive radio network, which attempt to intercept the packets transmitted from CUs to CBS. For notational convenience, we denote M CUs and N eavesdroppers by
In addition, when a CU and a PT simultaneously transmit to their respective destination nodes, PT also causes an interference to CBS in decoding the CU's signal. Following [23] and [26] , the interference received at CBS from PT is considered to be a complex Gaussian random variable under an assumption that the primary signal may be generated by the random Gaussian codebook. Moreover, the thermal noise at CBS is also complex Gaussian distributed. Thus, the interference plus noise at CBS, denoted by n b , can be modeled as a complex Gaussian random variable with zero mean and variance N b , which is represented by n b ∼ CN (0, N b ). Similarly, we can also model the interference plus noise received at an eavesdropper E j , denoted by n ej , as a complex Gaussian random variable i.e. n ej ∼ CN (0, N ej ). In the cognitive radio network shown in Fig. 1 , M CUs may access the licensed band and transmit to CBS using an orthogonal multiple access method e.g. the orthogonal frequency division multiple access (OFDMA). Generally speaking, the licensed band is first divided into multiple subchannels which are then assigned to M CUs. Given a subchannel, we may need to determine which CU should be selected to access the subchannel, which will be discussed in the following Section III. Without loss of generality, considering that CU i transmits its signal x i to CBS with power P i , we can express the received signal at CBS as
where h ib is the fading coefficient of the channel from CU i to CBS and n b ∼ CN (0, N b ) represents the interference and thermal noise received at CBS. Using the Shannon's channel capacity formula, the capacity of the main channel from CU i to CBS can be obtained from (2) as
Meanwhile, due to the broadcast nature of radio propagation, the CU i -CBS transmission may also be overheard by N eavesdroppers. Thus, the signal received at an eavesdropper E j can be written as
where h iej is the fading coefficient of the channel from CU i to E j and n ej ∼ CN (0, N ej ) represents the interference and thermal noise received at eavesdropper E j . Similarly to (3), the capacity of the wiretap channel from CU i to E j is obtained from (4) as
In this paper, we consider two eavesdropping scenarios: 1) uncoordinated case, where the eavesdroppers are independent of each other in intercepting the CU i -CBS transmission; and 2) coordinated case, where the eavesdroppers collaborate for intercepting the cognitive transmissions. In the uncoordinated case, the eavesdroppers perform the interception independently and the CU i -CBS transmission is secure when all N eavesdroppers fail to decode the signal x i . Thus, the overall capacity of the wiretap channel from CU i to N eavesdroppers can be given by the maximum of individual achievable rates at N eavesdroppers, yielding
for the uncoordinated case, where E denotes the set of N eavesdroppers. In the coordinated case, N eavesdroppers first combine their received signals to obtain an enhanced version for the sake of improving the possibility of successfully decoding the signal x i . Considering the maximal ratio combining (MRC) and using (4), we obtain a combined version of the received signals at N eavesdroppers as
from which the overall capacity of the wiretap channel from CU i to N eavesdroppers is given by
for the coordinated case. As discussed in [8] and [9] , the secrecy capacity of wireless transmissions is shown as the difference between the capacity of the main channel and that of the wiretap channel. Thus, we can obtain the secrecy capacity of CU i -CBS transmission in the presence of N eavesdroppers as
where C ib is given by (3) and C ie is characterized by (6) and (7) for the uncoordinated and coordinated cases, respectively. Additionally, all the wireless channels shown in Fig. 1 In this section, we present several multi-user scheduling schemes including the round-robin scheduling, the optimal user scheduling, and the suboptimal user scheduling in the presence of the uncoordinated and coordinated eavesdroppers. The optimal user scheduling is aimed to maximize the secrecy capacity of the cognitive transmissions from CUs to CBS, assuming that the CSIs of all CUs-CBS, CUs-PR, and CUs-E j links are available. By contrast, the suboptimal user scheduling only assumes that the CSIs of CUs-CBS links are known, attempting to address the multi-user scheduling without the PR's and eavesdroppers' CSI knowledge. The closed-form secrecy outage probability expressions of the round-robin scheduling as well as the optimal and suboptimal scheduling are also derived for both the uncoordinated and coordinated eavesdroppers.
A. Round-Robin Scheduling
This subsection presents the conventional round-robin scheduling as a benchmark. With the round-robin scheduling, M CUs take turns in accessing the licensed spectrum and thus each user has an equal chance to transmit its signal to CBS. As is known, a secrecy outage event occurs when the secrecy capacity drops below a predefined secrecy rate R s . Thus, given that CU i transmits to CBS, the secrecy outage probability of CU i -CBS transmission is obtained as
where C s i is given by (8) . Substituting (3) and (6) into (8) and combining with (9) yield
for the uncoordinated case, which is further obtained as (see Appendix A)
where N is the number of eavesdroppers, E n represents the n-th non-empty subset of the elements of E, and |E n | is the cardinality of set E n . Additionally, it is observed from (7) that obtaining a general closed-form expression of the secrecy outage probability P out,i for the coordinated case is challenging. For simplicity, we assume that the fading coefficients of all CU i -E j channels |h iej | 2 are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables for different eavesdroppers with the same average channel gain denoted by σ
. This assumption is widely used and valid in a statistical sense when all eavesdroppers are uniformly distributed around CUs. Moreover, proceeding as Appendix A and assuming that different eavesdroppers have the same noise variance of N ej = N e , we can obtain the secrecy outage probability P out,i from (7), (8) and (9) as
for the coordinated case. As aforementioned, the round-robin scheduling scheme allows M CUs to take turns in accessing the licensed spectrum and thus the secrecy outage probability of the round-robin scheduling is the mean of M CUs' secrecy outage probabilities, yielding
where M is the number of CUs and P out,i is given by (11) and (12) for the uncoordinated and coordinated cases, respectively.
B. Optimal User Scheduling
In this subsection, we propose an optimal user scheduling scheme for the sake of improving the security of the CUs-CBS transmissions. Considering M CUs available in the cognitive radio network, a CU with the highest secrecy capacity is selected to access a given spectrum band. Therefore, using (8), we can express the optimal user scheduling criterion as
where U represents the set of CUs. Substituting (3) and (6) into (14) gives
for the uncoordinated case. Moreover, substituting (3) and (7) into (14) yields
for the coordinated case. One can observe from (15) and (16) that the CSIs |h ib | 2 , |h ip | 2 and |h iej | 2 of the CU i -CBS, CU i -PR and CU i -E j links as well as the number of eavesdroppers N and the noise variance N ej are assumed in determining the optimal user among M CUs. However, the PR's and eavesdroppers' CSIs, the number of eavesdroppers, and the noise variance may be unavailable in some cases. To this end, the following subsection will consider the multi-user scheduling without the need of these information. Using (14) , the secrecy outage probability of the proposed optimal user scheduling scheme can be obtained as (17) where C s i is given by (8) . Combining (9) and (17), we obtain the secrecy outage probability of the optimal scheduling as
where P out,i is given by (11) and (12) for the uncoordinated and coordinated cases, respectively.
C. Suboptimal User Scheduling
This subsection proposes a suboptimal user scheduling scheme under the condition that only the CSIs of CUs-CBS channels are available without knowing the CSI knowledge of the primary receiver and eavesdroppers. Since only the CSIs of CUs-CBS channels are known in this case, a CU with the highest instantaneous fading gain to CBS is typically regarded as the optimal user, yielding
where U represents the set of M CUs. It is observed from (19) that only |h ib | 2 is needed in the suboptimal user scheduling scheme without the PR's and eavesdroppers' CSIs |h ip | 2 and |h iej | 2 . This is different from the aforementioned optimal user scheduling scheme which requires the CSIs of all CU i -CBS, CU i -PR and CU i -E j channels (i.e., |h ib | 2 , |h ip | 2 , and |h iej | 2 ). For notational convenience, let 'o' denote the optimal user determined by (19) . Thus, the secrecy capacity of the transmission from the optimal user (o) to CBS in the presence of N uncoordinated eavesdroppers is obtained as
where C ob and C oej , respectively, represent the channel capacities from the optimal user to CBS and to eavesdropper E j , which are given by
and
where |h ob | 2 , |h op | 2 , and |h oej | 2 represent fading coefficients of the channels from the optimal user to CBS, to PR, and to eavesdropper E j , respectively. Combining (20)- (22), we obtain the secrecy outage probability of the proposed suboptimal user scheduling scheme as
for the uncoordinated case. By using the law of total probability and denoting t =
Pr 2
Rs I max
Combining (19) and (24), we have
By using the result of Appendix B, the secrecy outage probability P sub out is obtained from (25) as
for the uncoordinated case, where E n represents the n-th nonempty subset of the elements of E, P The following presents the secrecy outage probability analysis of the suboptimal user scheduling for the coordinated eavesdroppers. As mentioned earlier in Section III-A, it is challenging to obtain a general closed-form expression of the secrecy outage probability for the coordinated case. We here consider that the fading coefficients |h iej | 2 for e j ∈ E are i.i.d. with the same mean of σ 2 ie and different eavesdroppers have the same noise variance of N e . Hence, substituting N ej = N e into (7) and using the law of total probability, we obtain the secrecy outage probability P sub out of the suboptimal user scheduling as (27) for the coordinated case, which is further given by (see Appendix C)
where P out,I , P out,II and P out,III are given by (C.13), (C.14) and (C.15), respectively. So far, we have derived closed-form secrecy outage expressions for the round-robin scheduling as well as the optimal and suboptimal scheduling schemes in the presence of the uncoordinated and coordinated eavesdroppers, which will be used in Section V for conducting numerical evaluation of the secrecy outage performance.
IV. SECRECY DIVERSITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the secrecy diversity performance of multi-user cognitive transmissions in the presence of multiple uncoordinated and coordinated eavesdroppers. Although the closed-form secrecy outage expressions shown in (13), (18) , (26) and (28) can be used to show the transmission security performance of various user scheduling schemes, they fail to provide an intuitive insight into the impact of the number of CUs and eavesdroppers on the cognitive transmission security. As a consequence, this section presents the secrecy diversity analysis of the round-robin scheduling as well as the optimal and suboptimal scheduling schemes.
A. Round-Robin Scheduling
Let us consider the round-robin scheduling as a baseline for comparison. First, the cognitive radio transmission is subject to the primary QoS constraint i.e. the maximum tolerable interference level at PR I. Generally speaking, with an increasing I, the secrecy outage probability of cognitive transmissions decreases accordingly. From (11) and (13), we obtain
for the uncoordinated case. One can observe from (29) that as the maximum tolerable interference level I tends to infinity, the secrecy outage probability of the round-robin scheduling scheme converges to a non-zero constant. From (1), an infinite I means that the transmit power of CUs approaches infinity. Hence, as the CUs' transmit power increases to infinity, a secrecy outage probability floor occurs. Notice that the secrecy outage floor provides a lower bound on the secrecy outage probability that a cognitive radio system can achieve with high interference temperature. It is also meaningful and effective to employ the secrecy outage floor as a metric to evaluate the security performance of different signal processing techniques in a cognitive radio system. For notational convenience, the secrecy outage floor of the round-robin scheduling scheme is denoted by P round out,f loor , i.e., P 
log SNR , where SNR stands for the signal-to-noise ratio and P e (SNR) represents the bit error rate as a function of SNR. However, as the CUs' transmit power increases to infinity, the secrecy outage probability of (30) tends to a non-zero constant, which makes the traditional diversity definition become inappropriate for the secrecy outage analysis. It is also observed from (30) that with an infinite transmit power, the secrecy outage probability becomes nothing to do with the CUs-PR channel h ip and is mainly determined by the main channel h ib and eavesdropping channel h iej . Motivated by this observation, we here define a secrecy diversity gain as an asymptotic ratio of the logarithmic secrecy outage floor to the logarithmic MER λ me (i.e., the ratio between the reference gains of the main channel and eavesdropping channel) as λ me → ∞ [28] , yielding in high MER region. This also shows that as MER increases, the secrecy outage floor P round out,f loor decreases faster with a higher diversity order d round . Therefore, the secrecy diversity order can be used as a simple but effective metric to evaluate the secrecy outage floor performance, especially in high MER region. Substituting (30) into (31), we obtain the secrecy diversity of the round-robin scheduling scheme as
for the uncoordinated case, which shows that the secrecy diversity order of only one is achieved by the round-robin scheduling scheme, when the eavesdroppers are independent of each other in intercepting the cognitive transmissions.
In what follows, we analyze the secrecy diversity of the roundrobin scheduling for the coordinated case. Noting N ej > 0 and using the inequality min
, we have
which may be further given by
which is obtained by using the inequality max
where N is the number of eavesdroppers. Combining (33) and (34) with (9), we have
where the lower and upper bounds P lower out,i and P upper out,i are given by
for the coordinated case. Comparing (36) and (37) with (10) and using (30), we readily obtain
(39) Combining (38) and (39) with (13) yields
for the coordinated case. Substituting (40) into (31) and using (38) and (39) give
which can be further obtained from the squeeze theorem as
for the coordinated case. As shown in (32) and (42), no matter whether the eavesdroppers collaborate or not, the round-robin scheduling scheme always achieves the diversity order of only one. This also means that the round-robin scheme fails to achieve any secrecy diversity benefits with multiple CUs.
B. Optimal User Scheduling
This subsection analyzes the secrecy diversity order of the proposed optimal user scheduling scheme. Using (18) and letting I → ∞, we obtain the secrecy outage floor of the optimal user scheduling scheme as
where lim I→∞ P out,i is further computed from (11) as
for the uncoordinated case, where N is the number of eavesdroppers, Substituting (44) into (43) gives
where M is the number of CUs. Similarly to (31), the secrecy diversity order of the optimal user scheduling scheme is defined as
Substituting (45) into (46) yields
for the uncoordinated case, which demonstrates that the secrecy diversity order of M is achieved by the optimal scheduling scheme when the eavesdroppers are independent of each other in tapping the cognitive transmissions. Similarly to (40), we may obtain the secrecy outage floor of the optimal user scheduling as 
from which the secrecy diversity of the optimal user scheduling scheme is readily obtained as
for the coordinated case. It is seen from (47) and (50) that for both the uncoordinated and coordinated eavesdroppers, the optimal user scheduling achieves the diversity order of M . This can also be interpreted as that the secrecy outage probability floor of the optimal user scheduling behaves as ( 1 λme ) M in high MER region. Therefore, with an increasing number of CUs, the secrecy outage floor of the optimal user scheduling decreases significantly, showing its advantage over the round-robin scheduling scheme.
C. Suboptimal User Scheduling
This subsection is focused on the secrecy diversity analysis of the suboptimal user scheduling scheme. Let us first analyze the secrecy outage floor of the suboptimal user scheduling with an infinite I. From (25), we obtain (51) at the top of the following page for the uncoordinated case. Considering that |h iej | 2 and |h kb | 2 are independent exponentially distributed P sub out,f loor = lim
random variables with respective means σ 2 iej and σ 2 kb and denoting |h ib | 2 = x, we can equivalently rewrite (51) as
Using the binomial theorem,
can be expanded as
where E n represents the n-th non-empty subset of the elements of E. Substituting (53) into (52) yields
Using the result of Appendix D, we have
for λ me → ∞, where 1 = represents an equality with probability 1, and x is a random variable with the following PDF
wherein 0 < x < ∞. Hence, letting λ me → ∞ and substituting (55) into (54) yield (57) for the uncoordinated case. Similarly to (31), the secrecy diversity order of the suboptimal user scheduling scheme is defined as
Combining (57) and (58), we obtain the diversity order of the suboptimal user scheduling as
for the uncoordinated case. Additionally, combining (3) and (34), we may obtain the lower and upper bounds on the secrecy outage probability floor of the suboptimal user scheduling scheme as
where P lower out and P upper out are given by
for the coordinated case. Comparing (61) and (62) with (51) and using (57), we similarly obtain (63) and (64) at the top of the following page.
Substituting (60) into (58) and using (63) and (64), we obtain the secrecy diversity of the suboptimal user scheduling as
for the coordinated case. It can be observed from (59) and (65) that no matter whether the eavesdroppers are coordinated or not, the suboptimal user scheduling scheme achieves the diversity order of M , which is the same as the optimal user scheduling approach. It is worth mentioning that the suboptimal user scheduling only needs the CSIs of CUs-CBS links. However, the optimal user scheduling assumes that the CSIs of all links from CUs to CBS, to PR and to E j are known, which makes it challenging to be applied in practical cognitive radio systems. Therefore, from a practical perspective, the suboptimal scheduling scheme is more attractive than the optimal scheduling.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we present numerical comparison among the round-robin scheduling, the optimal user scheduling and the suboptimal user scheduling in terms of secrecy outage probability. Throughout the numerical secrecy outage evaluation, we assume that the background noise and interference received at any node in the cognitive radio network shown in Fig. 1  (including CBS and N eavesdroppers) have the same variance, i.e., N b = N ej for e j ∈ E. For notational convenience, let λ I denote the ratio of the maximum allowable interference power I to the noise variance N b , i.e., γ I = I/N b . Fig. 2 shows the secrecy outage probability versus the maximum allowable interference level γ I of the round-robin scheduling as well as the optimal and suboptimal scheduling schemes for the uncoordinated and coordinated cases by using (13) , (18), (26) and (28) . Simulation results of the secrecy outage probability for these three schemes are also provided in this figure. It is observed from Fig. 2 that as the maximum allowable interference level γ I increases, the secrecy outage probabilities of the round-robin scheduling, the suboptimal user scheduling and the optimal user scheduling schemes all decrease. This can be explained that with an increasing γ I , CUs are allowed to transmit with higher power, leading to a decrease of the secrecy outage probability. One can see from Fig. 3 . Secrecy outage probability versus secrecy rate Rs of the round-robin scheduling, the suboptimal user scheduling and the optimal user scheduling schemes for both the uncoordinated and coordinated cases with M = 8, N = 4, λme = 10 dB, γ I = 10 dB, and σ 2 ib = σ 2 ip = θ ib = θ ie j = 1.
schemes both have a lower secrecy outage floor than the round-robin scheduling. Moreover, for both the uncoordinated and coordinated cases, the optimal user scheduling strictly outperforms the suboptimal user scheduling in terms of the secrecy outage probability. Fig. 2 also illustrates that the secrecy outage performance of the round-robin scheduling as well as the optimal and suboptimal scheduling corresponding to the uncoordinated eavesdroppers is expectedly better than that of these three schemes corresponding to the coordinated eavesdroppers. This means that the eavesdroppers may collaborate with each other for the sake of degrading the secrecy outage performance of cognitive transmissions. In addition, the simulation results match well the theoretical secrecy outage probabilities, confirming the correctness of the secrecy outage analysis. Fig. 3 depicts the secrecy outage probability versus secrecy rate R s of the round-robin scheduling, the suboptimal user scheduling and the optimal user scheduling schemes for both the uncoordinated and coordinated cases. As shown in Fig. 3 , with an increasing secrecy rate R s , the secrecy outage proba- Fig. 4 . Secrecy outage probability versus the number of eavesdroppers N of the round-robin scheduling, the suboptimal user scheduling and the optimal user scheduling schemes for both the uncoordinated and coordinated cases with M = 8, Rs = 1 bit/s/Hz, λme = 10 dB, γ I = 10 dB, and
bilities of these three schemes in the presence of coordinated or uncoordinated eavesdroppers all increase accordingly. In other words, when a higher secrecy rate R s is adopted by CUs for better throughput performance, it is less likely to achieve the perfect secure transmission against eavesdropping attacks. It is also seen from Fig. 3 that for both the coordinated and uncoordinated cases, the optimal user scheduling scheme achieves the best secrecy outage performance and the roundrobin scheduling performs the worst across the whole secrecy rate region.
In Fig. 4 , we show the secrecy outage probability versus the number of eavesdroppers N of the round-robin scheduling, the suboptimal user scheduling and the optimal user scheduling schemes for both the uncoordinated and coordinated eavesdroppers. One can observe from Fig. 4 that as the number of eavesdroppers N increases, the secrecy outage probabilities of these three schemes all increase for both the uncoordinated and coordinated cases. Nevertheless, given a certain number of uncoordinated (or coordinated) eavesdroppers, the optimal and suboptimal user scheduling schemes both perform better than the round-robin scheduling in terms of the secrecy outage probability. Fig. 5 illustrates the secrecy outage probability versus the number of CUs M of the round-robin scheduling as well as the optimal and suboptimal scheduling schemes for both the uncoordinated and coordinated cases with a low MER of λ me = −3 dB, which means that the average channel gain of the eavesdroppers is two times better than that of the legitimate CUs. It is shown from Fig. 5 that upon increasing the number of CUs, the secrecy outage probability of the round-robin scheduling scheme keeps unchanged for both the uncoordinated and coordinated cases, showing no security benefits achieved with an increasing number of CUs. By contrast, the secrecy outage probabilities of the optimal and suboptimal user scheduling schemes both significantly decrease, as the number of CUs increases. Therefore, when . Secrecy outage probability versus the number of CUs M of the round-robin scheduling, the suboptimal user scheduling and the optimal user scheduling schemes for both the uncoordinated and coordinated cases with N = 2, Rs = 0.2 bit/s/Hz, λme = −3 dB, γ I = 10 dB, and
either the optimal or suboptimal user scheduling is adopted, the security of cognitive transmissions may be improved by increasing the number of CUs. In other words, upon increasing the number of CUs, any target secrecy outage probability can be guaranteed by relying on the optimal or suboptimal user scheduling scheme even with a very low MER.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the secrecy outage and diversity performance of a multi-user multi-eavesdropper cognitive radio system, where CUs transmit to a common CBS with a primary QoS constraint in the presence of multiple coordinated or uncoordinated eavesdroppers. We have presented the roundrobin scheduling, optimal user scheduling and suboptimal user scheduling schemes to protect the CUs-CBS transmissions against the eavesdropping attacks. Closed-form expressions of the secrecy outage probability of these three schemes have been derived for both the coordinated and uncoordinated cases. We have also conducted the secrecy diversity analysis of the round-robin scheduling as well as the optimal and suboptimal user scheduling in the presence of the coordinated and uncoordinated eavesdroppers. It has been proven that no matter whether the eavesdroppers collaborate or not, the round-robin scheduling achieves the secrecy diversity order of only one, whereas the optimal and suboptimal scheduling schemes both obtain the diversity order of M , where M is the number of CUs. Numerical results have demonstrated that as the maximum allowable interference level increases, the secrecy outage performance of the round-robin scheduling as well as the optimal and suboptimal user scheduling improves accordingly. Additionally, for both the coordinated and uncoordinated cases, the optimal and suboptimal user scheduling schemes significantly outperform the round-robin scheduling approach in terms of the secrecy outage probability.
In the present paper, we only studied the physical-layer security of CUs-CBS transmissions without considering the PUs' security for the primary network. In cognitive radio networks, CUs and PUs typically share the same spectrum band, thus the eavesdroppers may tap both the CUs' and PUs' transmissions. It is thus of high interest to investigate the impact of the uncoordinated and coordinated eavesdroppers on the security of both CUs and PUs. Considering the fact that PUs have a higher priority than CUs in accessing the licensed spectrum, we may impose a security constraint on the PUs' transmissions (e.g., the secrecy capacity, secrecy outage probability, etc.) with an objective of maximizing the CUs' security performance with the aid of some signal processing techniques, e.g. multi-user scheduling and beamforming. Besides, due to estimation errors in practical channel estimators, the perfect CSI is impossible to be obtained. It is interesting to further examine the impact of CSI estimation errors on the secrecy outage performance of various scheduling schemes. We leave these interesting problems for our future work.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF (11) AND (12) For notational convenience, let X denote term 
where −∞ < x < ∞. For x < 0, (A.1) can be given by
Combining (A.2) and (A.3), we can prove that the CDF of X is first-order differentiable for −∞ < x < ∞ and obtain the probability density function (PDF) of X as
Noting that |h iej | 2 for e j ∈ E are independent exponentially distributed random variables with respective means of σ 2 iej for different eavesdroppers, we can rewrite (10) as
Substituting (A.4) into (A.5) yields
where term
) can be expanded with the binomial theorem as
where N is the number of eavesdroppers, E n represents the n-th non-empty subset of the elements of E, and |E n | is the cardinality of set E n . Substituting (A.7) into (A.6) and performing the integration yield
which is (11) . Additionally, substituting (3), (7) and (8) into (9) and assuming different eavesdroppers with the same noise variance of N ej = N e , we have Ne , whose PDF is given by 10) for y > 0, where N is the number of eavesdroppers. Noting that random variables X and Y are independent and combining (A.4), (A.9) and (A.10), we obtain
which is (12) .
APPENDIX B DERIVATION OF (26) Considering that |h ib | 2 and |h ip | 2 are independent exponentially distributed and denoting X = |h ib | 2 and Y = |h ip | 2 , we can easily obtain the joint PDF of random variables (X, Y ) as
for (x > 0, y > 0). Thus, we can rewrite (25) as
Pr 2 Rs I max
where the second equation arises from the fact that random variables |h iej | 2 and |h kb | 2 (for e j ∈ E and k ∈ U) are independent of each other. Noting that |h iej | 2 and |h kb | 2 are exponential random variables with respective means σ ) is expanded by
where E n represents the n-th non-empty subset of the elements of E and |E n | is the cardinality of set E n . Similarly, we can obtain term 5) where U m represents the m-th non-empty subset of the elements of U − {CU i }, '−' represents the set difference, and |U m | is the cardinality of set U m . Substituting (B.4) and (B.5) into (B.3) yields 
Combining (B.1) and (B.7), we obtain
which is further computed as 
(B.12)
Similarly, substituting (B.1) into (B.8) yields 
(B.14)
In addition, combining (B.1) and (B.9), we obtain P sub out,III as into (B.6) yields (26) .
APPENDIX C DERIVATION OF (28)
can rewrite (27) as
Considering that the fading coefficients |h iej | 2 for e j ∈ E are i.i.d. with the same mean of σ 2 ie , we readily obtain that the random variable z is Gamma distributed with the mean of N σ , we obtain the joint PDF of (X, Y, Z) as
for (x, y, z) > 0. Noting that |h kb | 2 and |h ib | 2 are independent exponential random variables and combining (C.1) and (C.2), we have
y . Noting (x, y, z) > 0, we may divide Θ into two mutually exclusively sets i.e. Θ 1 and Θ 2 , where Θ 1 and Θ 2 are given by
By using (x, y, z) > 0, Θ 1 can be further divided into two mutually exclusively sets Θ 11 and Θ 12 , which are described as 6 ) and
(P out,I + P out,II + P out,III ), (C.8)
where P out,I , P out,II and P out,III are given by
(C.10) and
(C.11) Substituting (C.2) and (C.6) into (C.9) yields
where the term
) may be expanded to Similarly to (D.3) and (D.4), we can easily prove that for λ me → ∞, the mean and variance of z 2 are high-order infinitesimals as compared with the mean and variance of z. Meanwhile, due to 0 < θ < 1 and z > 0, we have 0 < exp(−θz) < 1. Thus, term for λ me → ∞, which is (55). 
